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1. Introduction 
Eckstein and Wolpin's (1990) empirical analysis of the Albrecht and Axell 
(1984) equilibrium search model is an important step forward in the structural 
analysis of labour market search. For the first time in an empirical study 
labour market search is modelled as the outcome of optimal choices by both 
workers and employers. This improves on the structural partial models of job 
search in which workers choose an optimal strategy given the decisions of 
firrns, but the distribution of wage offers is assumed to be invariant and is 
treated as exogenous in the empirical analysis. If workers make a labour 
supply decision given a wage offer, and firms set wages for vacancies, then 
current empirical models of job search are based on the assumptions that (i) 
in setting wages firms do not consider the strategy of workers and (ii) the 
resulting wage offers are dispersed. 
The optimal strategy of the workers usually has the reservation wage 
property. If employers know this, then in equilibrium their wage offers must 
equal the reservation wage of some (group of) worker(s). In particular, if all 
job searchers have a common reservation wage, then the equilibrium wage offer 
distribution is degenerate. The assumption of a dispersed wage offer 
distribution therefore requires a dispersed distribution of reservation wages. 
If the wage offer distribution depends on the distribution of reservation 
wages, then parameter changes that affect the reservation wages of job 
searchers also affect the wage offer distribution that they face. 
Hence, the assumption that the wage offer distribution is exogenous to the 
job search model is hard to justify. This affects both the key assumption in 
this model, i.e. the assumption that job seekers face a dispersed wage offer 
distribution, and the comparative-static analysis of parameter changes. For 
instance, an important question as the effect of unemployment benefits on job 
search by the unemployed cannot be answered satisfactorily without allowing 
for the possibility that employers respond to changes in the behaviour of job 
seekers. In an equilibrium search model the wage offer distribution is 
endogenous. It results from optimal wage setting by firms that take account of 
the responses by job seekers and other firms. The fact that the wage offer 
distribution is determined by the model is convenient, since this distribution 
is essentially unobservable. If job seekers use a reservation wage strategy, 
Structural empirical analyses of job search by the unemployed include 
Narendranathan and Nickell (1985), Wolpin (1987) and Van den Berg (1990a). Van 
den Berg (1992) estimates a structural model ol job search by employed 
individuals. Devine and Kiefer (1990) survey the literature. 
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then the distribution of accepted wages is the wage offer distribution 
truncated at the reservation wage. It is well-known that one cannot recover 
the complete wage offer distribution from this truncated distribution of 
accepted wages (Flinn and Heekman (1982)). 
The Albrecht-Axell model is not the only equilibrium search model that is 
amenable to estimation. Our empirical analysis of equilibrium search is based 
on a model proposed by Burdett and Mortensen (1993). There are some striking 
differences bet ween these two models, and it should be stressed from the 
outset that the empirical models of Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) and of this 
paper are not nested. In the Albrecht-Axell model all job seekers are 
unemployed. Hence, to obtain a dispersed wage offer distribution it is 
required that the unemployed are heterogeneous. Albrecht and Axell (1984) and 
Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) assume that there are several types of job 
searchers differing in their value of non-market time. Because the number of 
types is finite, the number of distinct reservation wages and hence the number 
of points of support of the wage offer distribution is also finite. This is 
clearly an unattractive feature of the model. In the Albrecht-Axell model it 
is also assumed that firms are heterogeneous with respect to their labour 
productivity. This allows for an equilibrium in which low productivity firms 
and high productivity firms have different profit-maximizing wage offers, so 
the resulting wage offer distribution is non-degenerate. 
A second difference between the two models (related to the first) concerns 
job durations. In the Albrecht-Axell model, jobs, once accepted, are held 
forever. In particular, the model does not allow for job-to-job transitions. 
This is clearly counterfactual. Moreover, job-to-job transitions are the most 
important source of wage growth (Topel and Ward (1993)), and this points at 
the importance of wage setting for maintaining the workforce of a firm. The 
possibility of on-the-job search changes the optimal search strategy of 
unemployed job seekers. Furthermore, since the reservation wage of an employed 
job seeker is equal to his current wage, allowing for on-the-job search 
extends the range of reservation wages considerably. Hence, the possibility of 
search while employed aids in generating a dispersed equilibrium wage offer 
distribution. 
Indeed, Burdett and Mortensen (1993) show that if workers continuously 
search for a better-paying job (and face a risk of becoming unemployed during 
that quest) then the equilibrium wage offer distribution is dispersed, even if 
all workers and firms are identical. In the latter case they obtain explicit 
solutions for the equilibrium wage offer and earnings distributions. 
The availability of an explicit solution is an advantage in the empirical 
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analysis of the model. On the other hand, the solution has some unattractive 
features. In particular, the wage offer and earnings distribution have 
increasing densities. This implication is at odds with all the evidence on the 
shape of the income distribution, which is closely related to the earnings 
distribution. However, it should be stressed that the explicit solution refers 
to a homogeneous population of workers and firms. Allowing for observed and 
unobserved population heterogeneity makes the model more realistic and more 
able to give an acceptable fit to the data. The heterogeneity in our empirical 
version of the Burdett-Mortensen model is different from the heterogeneity in 
the Albrecht-Axell model. We consider a labour market that consists of a large 
nurnber of segments. Every segment is a labour market of its own, and all 
workers and firms in a particular segment are identical. The segments differ 
according to the age, the educational level and the occupational level of the 
workers/jobs. Besides these observed differences we allow for unobserved 
differences in the productivity of the jobs or other characteristics of the 
segment. Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), in their empirical analysis of the 
Albrecht-Axell model, consider a single labour market with unobserved 
differences in the value of leisure between workers and unobserved differences 
in productivity between firms (they do not allow for observed differences 
between workers and firms). So our treatment of population heterogeneity 
allows for between-market heterogeneity while Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) allow 
for within-market heterogeneity. As we will show, this distinction has 
important consequences as it makes the effect of a change in the minimum wage 
qualitatively different. 
We estimate the model by Maximum Likelihood, using panel data on 
unemployed and employed individuals. For most individuals in the data, 
multiple durations (like unemployment durations and job durations) are 
observed. In particular, for some respondents, we observe consecutive job 
durations and corresponding wages. The estimation results are used to estimate 
the degree of monopsony power of firms and the effects of changes in the legal 
minimum wage. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. We 
argue that it is consistent with a number of stylized f acts. In Section 3 we 
discuss the data used to estimate the model. In Section 4 we derive the 
likelihood function. Section 5 contains the results. We also discuss some 
implications of the estimates. Conclusions and some suggestions for further 
research are in Section 6. 
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2. The equilibrium search model 
In this section we present the equilibrium search model as developed by 
Burdett and Mortensen (1993) (see also Mortensen (1990)). First, we consider a 
labour market with homogeneous workers and firms. Later we shall indicate how 
we take account of heterogeneity of workers and firms. 
We make the following assumptions: 
Al. There are continua of workers and firms with measures m and 1, 
respectively. 
A2. Workers receive job offers at rate A0 if unemployed and X1 if employed. A 
job offer is an i.i.d. drawing from a wage offer distribution with c.d.f. 
F(w). An offer has to be accepted or rejected upon arrival. During tenure of a 
job the wage is constant. 
A3. Job-worker matches break up at rate <5. If this happens the worker becomes 
unemployed. The utility flow of being unemployed is b. 
A4. Firms have a linear production function and the marginal (=average) 
revenue product is p. A firm pays all its workers the same wage w. 
A5. Workers maximize their expected wealth, and firms maximize their 
steady-state profits. 
A6. The firms cannot set their wage below the mandatory minimum wage wL. 
Under these assumptions the supply side of the model is equivalent to the 
Standard job search model with on-the-job search (see e.g. Mortensen (1986)). 
Thus, the optimal strategy of an unemployed individual has the reservation 
wage property. Under zero discounting, the reservation wage r can be shown to 
be 
(2.1) r = b + (Ao-Ai) ƒ — ™ — dw with F = 1-F 
r S+X^iw) 
Further, an employed individual accepts a wage offer if and only if it exceeds 
his current wage. So a worker is continuously searching for a better paying 
job, but this effort may be frustrated by a spell of unemployment. The worker 
never quits a job to search for a better paying one while unemployed. 
It is important to distinguish between the distribution of wages offered 
to job seekers, which is the wage offer distribution F, and the distribution 
of wages received by workers who are currently employed. The latter 
distribution is referred to as the earnings distribution, and we denote this 
4 
distribution by G. Concentrate for the moment on the employed workers who 
receive a wage w or less. There are G(w){m-u) such workers, where u is the 
number of unemployed workers. The flow of workers to jobs with a wage that 
exceeds w is equal to A1F(w)G(w)(m-u) and the flow of workers into 
unemployment is 6G(w)(m-u). In a steady-state equilibrium this outflow must be 
balanced by an inflow from unemployment. This inflow equals \0(F{w)-F(r))u, 
where it is obvious that F(r) - 0, because firms offering a wage below r never 
attract any worker and therefore cannot survive. Hence, in a steady state we 
have the following relation between the earnings distribution and the wage 
offer distribution, 
(2.2) G(w) = F W . - * * « _ 
6+A1F(ty) (m-u) 
The steady-state unemployment rate u/m follows by imposing w = oo in (2.2), 
or, equivalently, by equating flows into and out of unemployment, 
(2.3) U S 
m 64-AQ 
This can be used to simplify (2.2) to 
6 .F(w) (2.4) G{w) = 
<5+A1F(w) 
The flow of revenue p generated by employing a worker must satisfy b<p«x, 
i.e there must be a positive gain from trade. A match between a worker and a 
firm has a net revenue flow of p-b. At the prevailing wage w, the firm 
receives the p - w of this flow, and the worker receives w-b. Recall that it is 
assumed that the wage paid by the firm is posted prior to the moment at which 
it contacts searching individuals, and that there is no bargaining over the 
wage. 
To derive the equilibrium distribution of wage offers over firms, we have 
to be more specific on the behaviour of the firms. The steady-state level of 
production is determined by the size of the steady-state workforce i that is 
available to the firm. The latter number is determined by the wage w set by 
the firm, by the reservation wage r set by the unemployed individuals, and by 
the distribution F of wages set by the other firms competing for the same 
workers (see Burdett and Mortensen (1993) for the general expression of 
l{w;r,F)). We assume that each firm chooses w to maximize its steady-state 
profit flow 7r, which equals {p-w)l{w;r,F), given r and F and subject to the 
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restriction that w exceeds the mandatory minimum wage wL. Hence, the firm does 
not react to random fluctuations in its workforce . For firms to have a 
positive level of employment, we need wL<p. 
A non-cooperative steady-state equilibrium solution consists of a 
reservation wage r and a wage offer distribution F such that (i) r satisfies 
(2.1) given F, and (ii) every w in the support of F maximizes the steady-state 
profit flow (p-w)l(w;r,F). Burdett and Mortensen (1993) prove that there is a 
unique equilibrium, and they give a complete characterization of it. 
First, the equilibrium F is absolutely continuous, and therefore not 
degenerate. Suppose there were a mass of firms offering a wage w. Then, by 
offering a wage slightly higher than w, each of these firms could increase its 
labour force significantly, attracting workers that currently earn w, while 
suffering only a second order loss of profit per worker p-w. Hence, prof its n 
would increase. The assumption that on-the-job search is possible is crucial 
for this result. It is not possible to have an equilibrium F for which the 
lower bound of the support exceeds both r and wL, or an equilibrium F with 
gaps in its support, because then firms offering w (firms at the upper 
boundary of the gap) can increase their prof its by offering a wage equal to 
max (wL,r) (by of f er ing a wage equal to the lower boundary of the gap). 
We conclude that F and G have probability density functions ƒ and g with 
support equal to [T0,W], with 
w = max (wL, r) 
and w the upper bound of the support of F and G with w<p. The measure of 
individuals earning a wage w equals g(w)(rn-u)dw, and the measure of firms 
offering a wage w equals f(w)dw. Consequently, l(w;r,F) equals 
(2.5) l(w;r,F) = #Hl<j« ( « - „ ) = rnX^S+X,) -
In the steady state a firm offering w has a positive workforce t(w;r,F) 
equal to 77iA06/(((5+A0)(5+A1)). Of course, the employees, who were all 
previously unemployed, leave for the first job they locate at another firm. 
The steady-state profit rate of the firms paying w is TV = (p-w)l(w;r,F). In 
equilibrium all higher paying firms have the same profit rate. Substitution of 
(2.5) gives the equilibrium wage offer distribution 
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The model becomes iutractable if this is relaxed, see Wernerfelt (1988). 
(2.6) F(w) = S+Xx /p-w 1 V p-w J on [w,w] 
with corresponding density 
(2.7) f(w) S+X1 
2\1Vp-w Vp- w 
on [w,w] 
It follows from (2.6) and (2.1) that 
r = 
(2.8) 
(<5+Ax) .b + (Ao-AiJAi .p + (Ao-AJ.Wi 
(5+A0)(*+Ai) 
( g + A t ) 2 ^ + (Ap-AJA^p 
( <5+Ax)2 + (Ao-A^Ai 
if r<wL 
if r>wL 
(2.9) w = 1<5+Axj .w + 1<5+Ai 
2> 
If r>«)£ then r and w are weighted averages of b and p. Note that r is smaller 
than b if Ax is larger than A0. If the arrival rate of job offers is larger 
when employed, unemployed workers accept job offers that are below b in order 
to engage in the more rewarding search on the job. 
The function t(w;r,F) increases in w, so there is a positive relation 
between the size of the firm and the wage it offers. A large (small) wage 
implies that the turnover of workers at the firm is small (large). Hence, in 
terms of total profits of a firm, there is a trade-off between the profit per 
worker and the steady-state number of workers at the firm. In this respect, 
there is a strong similarity to "turnover costs" efficiency wage models (see 
e.g. Stiglitz (1985) and Weiss (1991)). The maximum wage offer is strictly 
smaller than the productivity level p, which Burdett and Mortensen (1993) call 
the competitive equilibrium wage, i.e. the single equilibrium wage in the 
absence of search frictions. The search and wage-setting game has a 
monopsonistic equilibrium. 
From (2.4), the equilibrium earnings density is 
(2.10) g(w) = 
Syp-w 
2Ai (p-w) 3 / 2 
on [w,w] 
Note that both ƒ and g are increasing densities. The earnings distribution is 
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related to the income distribution, and there is abundant empirical evidence 
that the income distribution does not have an increasing density. However, as 
noted before, the increasing densities are derived for a homogeneous labour 
market with identical workers and firms. To show that allowing for 
heterogeneous workers and/or firms indeed improves the fit to the observed 
wage offer and earnings distributions we consider the following transformation 
of w 
(2.11) y = l^OL 
p - w 
so that the excess wage w-w satisfies 
(2.12) w-w = {l-y){p-w) 
The density of y is for the wage offer distribution 
(2.13) fy(y) = ^pjj'1'2 V2 <y<l 
and for the earnings distribution 
(2-14) gy(y) = ü^f*'* r? < y < l 
with 77= 8I(8+\X). Equation (2.12) describes the wage determination in the 
Burdett-Mortensen model. The excess wage w-w is a fraction of the excess 
productivity p-w. This fraction is a random variable with a distribution that 
depends on XJ6, the expected number of wage offers during a spell of 
employment, i. e. a spell that starts with the acceptance of a job from 
unemployment and ends with a layoff. This number is a measure of the speed at 
which the worker climbs the job (and wage) ladder with y=l corresponding to 
the bottom, w=w, and y=7? to the top, w=w, of this ladder. From (2.12) it 
follows that the moments of w-w in either the wage offer or the earnings 
distribution are the product of {p-w)n and an expression that only depends on 
77. By choosing an appropriate distribution of the productivity p, the moments 
of any observed wage offer or earnings distribution can be matched. Hence, we 
expect that an acceptable fit to the data wül depend on allowance for 
sufficiënt heterogeneity in p. 
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From the expressions above it is straightforward to derive the 
distributions of the sojourn times in different states. The duration of 
unemployment has an exponential distribution with parameter A0. The duration 
of a job that pays a wage w has an exponential distribution with parameter 
<5+A1F(IÜ). Exit from this job into unemployment occurs with probabüity 
6/(6+A1F(w)) and exit into another job with probabüity A1F(w)/(<5+A1F(w)). 
These distributions, as well as G(w) and F(w) itself, will be used in Section 
4 to construct the likelihood function of the model. Note that if r<wL, then r 
(and therefore b) enters none of the distributions mentioned here. 
Despite its apparent restrictiveness the model is consistent with results 
from previous empirical studies on unemployment durations and job durations in 
The Netherlands in the eighties. For example, the model implication that all 
jobs are acceptable to the unemployed is consistent with the finding from 
studies with partial job search models that the acceptance probabüity of 
unemployed workers is close to 1 (see e.g. Van den Berg (1990b); Devine and 
Kiefer (1990) survey the evidence for the US). The model also implies that a 
change of the benefit level does not affect unemployment. When b increases, 
then, as in partial job search models, the unemployed individual's reservation 
wage increases. However, in the present model employers modify their wage 
offers in response to this, and the net result is that the exit rate out of 
unemployment does not change (as long as b<p). This is consistent with the 
findings of many structural and reduced-form empirical studies on unemployment 
duration based on data from The Netherlands (see a survey in Van den Berg 
(1990b)). 
In empirical search models it is often found that the reservation wage is 
smaller than the benefits level (see e.g. Narendranathan and Nickell (1985), 
Van den Berg (1990a) and Van den Berg (1990b)). This is usually attributed to 
the existence of a non-pecuniary disutüity of being unemployed. The present 
model generates r<b if the job offer arrival rate is larger in employment than 
in unemployment. Finally, studies based on the panel data used in this paper 
confirm that there is an inverse relation between the wage in a job and the 
exit rate from a job, holding other factors constant (see Lindeboom and 
Theeuwes (1991) and Van den Berg (1992))3. 
Kiefer and Neumann (1991) and Machin and Manning (1991) discuss the 
consistency of the model with some additional stylized facts. 
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3. The data 
For the estimation of the model we use data from the OSA (Netherlands 
Organization for Strategie Labour Market Research) Labour Supply Panel Survey. 
This panel survey started in 1985. Presently four waves are available 
(April-May 1985, August-October 1986, August-October 1988, and August-November 
1990). 
In the OSA panel a random sample of households in The Netherlands is 
foliowed over time. The study concentrates on individuals who are between 15 
and 61 years of age, and who are not full-time students. Therefore only 
households with at least one person in this category are included. All 
individuals (and in all cases the head of the household) in this category are 
interviewed. The first wave consists of 4020 individuals (in 2132 households). 
In 1992, 1384 (34%) of these individuals are still in the panel. In 1986, 
1988, and 1990, refreshment samples were drawn, so that in 1990 the sample 
size was 4438 individuals. 
In the OSA panel an effort is made to collect extensive information on the 
labour market histories of the individuals. From these labour market histories 
we obtain the sequence of labour market states occupied by the individuals and 
the sojourn times in these states. A number of variables that give a more 
detailed description of the various positions is also recorded, notably income 
and occupation. Part of the information is retrospective. For example, in the 
first wave (in 1985) an attempt was made to reconstruct the labour market 
histories from January 1, 1980 until the date of interview (in 1985). The 
following labour market positions are distinguished: employment (job-to-job 
changes are recorded), self-employment, unemployment, and "not in the labour 
force" (military service, full-time education, and other activities not 
related to the labour market). In addition to these labour market histories, a 
number of time-constant individual characteristics are recorded, and an 
attempt was made to keep track of changes in time-varying characteristics as 
family composition, marital status, and level of education. 
In this paper we restrict attention to respondents who were participating 
in the panel as of the first wave, but not necessarily until and including the 
fourth wave. Individuals who were self-employed for some period during the 
time span covered by the survey are omitted, since it is likely that the 
behaviour of such individuals, at least in a certain period, deviates 
substantially from the behaviour that the model intends to describe. For 
similar reasons, we do not use information on respondents who are observed to 
be working in a part-time job or who are observed to be a nonparticipant for 
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some period. An alternative approach would be to extend the model to include a 
state of nonparticipation, and allow for transitions to and from this state. 
Van den Berg and Ridder (1993) develop such a model. It turns out that the 
main features of the model of Section 2 are insensitive to the inclusion of 
such a state. Moreover, transitions to and from nonparticipation are rare in 
the data. Therefore, using information on such transitions in an extended 
model context would, except for a number of imprecisely estimated nuisance 
parameters, probably not result in any gains. The restrictions reduce the 
number of labour market states to two: unemployment and full-time employment. 
The indicated selection results in a sample of 1949 individuals, of which 
217 (1732) were unemployed (employed) at the date of the first interview. In 
our sample, 34% participates in all four waves of the panel, while 33% only 
participates in the first wave. 
Income changes at transitions before the date of the first interview 
(April 1985) are only recorded to lie in one of a few broad intervals, so 
income in states occupied before this date is reported inaccurately relative 
to income in later states, for which we observe income levels. Moreover, using 
the spells ending before the date of the first interview generates 
computational problems in the estimation, as will become clear in the next 
section. To avoid these problems we do not use these spells, so the first 
spell used is the one that is ongoing at the date of the first interview. We 
basically use at most one additional spell besides this first spell (see the 
next section for details). 
After this selection we end up with 366 unemployment durations, of which 
30% is right-censored, and 2941 job durations, of which 42% is right-censored. 
Note that the right-censoring point is not fixed across spells. The number of 
observed wages is 1951. 
So far, b has been interpreted somewhat vaguely as the full opportunity 
cost of employment. In the sequel we take b to equal the benefit level. At the 
end of Section 4 we discuss how we assign numerical values to b. 
4. Empirical implementation 
4.1. The likelihood function 
We estimate the model of Section 2 by Maximum Likelihood, using the panel data 
described in Section 3. In this section we derive the individual contributions 
to the likelihood function. Because the expressions depend critically on the 
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labour market state occupied at the date of the first interview, we derive the 
contributions separately for individuals who are unemployed and individuals 
who are employed at that date. The results of Section 2 imply that the 
appropriate statistical model for labour market histories can be embedded in a 
three-state stationary Continuous-time Markov Chain (CTMC). The three states 
are unemployment and two employment states to allow for job-to-job 
transitions. 
The first job or unemployment spell we use is the spell that is ongoing at 
the date of the first interview. In the sequel we invoke arguments analogous 
to those in Ridder (1984) to derive the exact distribution of such spells. 
First, consider an individual who is unemployed at the date of the first 
interview. If the labour market history CTMC is in equilibrium, the 
probability of being unemployed at a randomly chosen date equals 6/(<5+A0). 
Conditional on the individual being unemployed at the date of the first 
interview, the elapsed unemployment duration tQb and the residual unemployment 
duration t0f are i.i.d. and have an exponential distribution with parameter 
A0. Let dob (d0f) denote a dummy that is one if it is only known that the 
elapsed (residual) duration exceeds a certain value (i. e. is right-censored), 
and zero otherwise. The likelihood contribution of the events until and 
including the moment of exit out of unemployment or censoring is 
( 4 J ) £
° = 4 A 7 • A^06+1-do'exp(-A0(ioi+*0/)) 
All events occurring after exit out of unemployment are independent of the 
events up to exit. Consequently, their probability can be derived separately. 
The first relevant event is the realization of the wage w in the accepted job. 
This is a random draw from the wage offer distribution F(w). Conditional on w, 
the job duration tx has an exponential distribution with parameter <5+AxF(w). 
Exit into unemployment occurs with probability S/(S+XiF(w)) and exit into 
another job with probability XiF(w)/(6+XiF(w)). 
We assume that wages are measured with error. Hartog and Van Ophem (1991) 
provide evidence for the presence of measurement errors in the wage data in 
the OSA panel. This is particularly serious, because as shown in Van den Berg 
and Ridder (1993), the dependence of the support of F(w) on the parameters of 
the model implies that the ML estimates of the parameters are sensitive to 
measurement errors in the wage data. Similar problems arise in the structural 
estimation of partial job search models (see e.g. Wolpin (1987)). To deal with 
these problems, we assume that the observed wage w equals the true wage w 
times an error term e which is i.i.d. across job spells and across 
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individuals, and which is independent of all other random variables in the 
model. Note that allowing for measurement errors also prevents the log 
likelihood to equal -oo if a transition from a job to a job with a lower wage 
is observed . We assume that e has a log-normal distribution with mean 1 and 
var(log e) = o . 
Let dx denote a variable being one if w is unobserved and zero otherwise. 
If dQf=l or dx=\ then the individual is not foliowed any further, so in that 
case (4.1) gives the total individual likelihood contribution. Let d2-l if tx 
is right-censored and d2—0 otherwise, and let dz=l if the destination 
following exit out of the job is unknown and d3=Q otherwise. Finally, let d4=l 
if the destination is another job and d4=0 if the destination is unemployment. 
If d0f=0 and dx=0 and if the wages are measured without error, then the 
individual likelihood contribution £x of the events between entry into 
employment and exit out of the first job equals 
Cx = f(w) . exp(-(6+A1F(w)).t1) . (6+\1F(w))d^1~d2) . 
. (\1F(W))d*{1-d2){1-d3). < 5 ( i - < y ( i - < y ( i - < y 
with we<w,io> (see Section 2 for the equations for w, w, f(w) and F(w)). 
Now let e be a random drawing from the density /i(e). If dof=0 and d1=0 
then 
w/w 
A = ƒ ƒ(«/£) • exp(-(«+A1F(w/c)).«1) . {S+Xj'iw/e))^1-^ . 
w/w 
(4.2) 
. (X^w/e))^1-^1-^ .
 6(l-<*4)(l-<*3)(l-<*2) 1 Me) d £ 
with we<0,oo>. 
To summarize, the total individual likelihood contribution for a 
respondent who is unemployed at the date of the first interview equals 
£ ( l -d 0 / ) ( l -<* i ) 
L.Q . L,x 
The integral in equation (4.2) has to be evaluated numerically. 
It is possible to use information on events occurring after completion of 
4 
In our sample, 11% of the observed job-to-job transitions result in a 
decrease of the observed wage. 
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tv However, note that the wage in a second job has to exceed the wage in the 
first one, so, conditional on the observed wages, the range of possible values 
of the second error term depends on the value of the first one. Because of 
this, the joint density of observed wages in consecutive job spells contains a 
multidimensional integral that is computationally demanding. For only 23 of 
the respondents who are unemployed at the first interview we observe more than 
one transition. Because of this, we have decided not to use information on 
events af ter exit from the first job af ter unemployment. 
Now consider an individual who is employed at the date of the first 
interview. Under the assumptions made above, the probability of being employed 
at a randomly chosen date equals A0/(<S+A0). Given that the individual is 
employed at the date of the interview, his wage w1 at that date is a random 
draw from the distribution G(w) of paid wages. As before, we take w1 = w1.e1. 
Let ds=l if w1 is unobserved, and d5=0 otherwise . If d5=l then the likelihood 
contribution is set to A0/(6+A0); otherwise it is constructed as follows. 
Conditional on being employed in a job with a wage wl at the date of the 
first interview, the elapsed job duration tlb and the residual job duration 
tXf are i.i.d. and have an exponential distribution with parameter 6+X1F(w1). 
Exit into unemployment occurs with probability (5/(5+A1F(w1)) and exit into 
another job with probability A1F(w1)/(<5+A1F(w1)). Let d6b (d6f) denote a 
variable being one if it is only known that the elapsed (residual) duration 
exceeds a certain value (i.e. is right-censored), and zero otherwise. Further, 
let d7=l if the destination following exit out of the job is unknown and d7=0 
otherwise, and let ds=l if the destination is another job and d8=0 if it is 
unemployment. 
Suppose that the destination is unemployment. The unemployment duration t0 
has an exponential distribution with parameter A0. We define da=l if t0 is 
right-censored, and dg—0 otherwise. If the destination is another job, then 
the wage w2 in the new job is a random draw from the wage offer distribution 
truncated from below at wx, that is, from F{w)/F(w1). Again, we set w2 = 
w2.e2. The duration t2 of the new job has an exponential distribution with 
parameter ó+A1F(w2). Exit into unemployment occurs with probability 
6/(5+A1F(w2)) and exit into another job with probability A1F(w2)/(<5+A1F(w2)). 
We define dummy variables dw, d u , d12 and dn that indicate whether w2 is 
unobserved, whether t2 is right-censored, whether the destination state is 
unobserved, and whether the destination state is another job. 
In the data, d5=0 for 93% of the 1732 individuals employed at the date of the 
first interview. 
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For computational reasons, we do not use information on events that occur 
after the completion of a second spell. As a consequence, the dimension of the 
(numerical) integral in the likelihood contribution is at most two. Further 
reduction of the dimension of the integral by deleting information on the job 
after a job-to-job transition would cause the loss of valuable information on 
the parameters of the job-to-job transition rate. 
If d5=Q, and if there is no measurement error, then the individual 
likelihood contribution equals 
L =
 4 t -9{Wl) • ( ' S + V K ) ) 1 " ^ .exp(-(6+A1F(%)).(i l i + t1/)) . 
• (ó+\inv>i))d7{1-d6f) .[6 . A o ^ - ^ . e x r t - A o t o ) ] * 1 - ^ 1 - ^ 1 - ^ / ) 
(4.3) XlF(Wl) . [ tphl .{6+\1F(w2))du{1-dll) . 
F(Wl) 
.(\F(w2)j ^13(l-rfl2)(l-^ll) - l ( l -^io) 
d6(l-dT)(l-d6f) 
with w1e<w,w> and w2e<w1,w>. Now let ex and e2 be independent random drawings 
from the density h(£). If ds=0 then £ can be rewritten as in (4.2), with a 
bivariate integral over ex (ranging from wjw to wjw) and e2 (ranging from 
wjw to £iW2/w1) and with 0<w1,w2<oo. This bivariate integral must be computed 
numerically. Apart from the area of integration, the integral factorizes in 
two one-dimensional integrals. This can be exploited to increase the speed of 
the numerical calculation. 
There are some simple checks on the specification of the model. Suppose 
that the estimate of the Standard deviation of e is relatively large. Then a 
large fraction of the variation in the wages cannot be explained by the model. 
Consequently, one may conclude that the model is not adequate. Further, by 
re-estimating the model using only subsets of the observed endogenous 
variables, various parts of the specification can be tested in a natural way. 
Mortensen (1990), Kiefer and Neumann (1991) and Van den Berg and Ridder 
(1993) extensively discuss the identification of the model of Section 2. Data 
on unemployment durations, job durations, destination states following exit 
out of a job and accepted wage offers suffice to identify the model 
parameters. Note that we observe more endogenous variables than this. 
Because the measurement error in the wages makes the support of the 
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distributions of observed wages independent of the parameters, the ML 
estimation of the model is Standard. If there are no measurement errors, the 
support of F and G depends on unknown parameters, so ML estimators have 
non-standard properties. Kiefer and Neumann (1991) suggest to use order 
statistics to estimate the bounds of the support. The parameters in these 
bounds can then be estimated from these super consistent estimates. We do not 
follow this suggestion because of the sensitivity of the resulting estimates 
to outliers and measurement errors, and because this method cannot deal easily 
with (un)observed population heterogeneity. 
4.2. Heterogeneity 
We introducé heterogeneity by assuming that there are separate labour markets 
(or segments of the labour market) for different types of individuals and 
firms. For example, there may be separate markets for individuals with 
different educational backgrounds. Furthermore, for each level of education, 
there may be separate markets for different age categories. To deal with this 
type of heterogeneity, the model can be estimated separately for each labour 
market, using only those individuals that belong to the labour market at hand. 
However, the number of individuals per market may be very small. In the 
empirical analysis below we distinguish separate labour markets by level of 
education, age, and occupation level (defined by the complexity of the job). 
For each of these three variables we distinguish four levels, so that we have 
64 segments . Six of these do not contain any respondents. For only 34 
segments we observe more than 10 individuals. 
Instead of estimating separate models for the 58 (64 minus 6) segments, we 
assume that the deep structural parameters in the model (p, A0, Al5 and <5) 
vary over the different labour markets in a fairly regular way that can be 
captured by simple parametric functions. Then we can estimate the parameters 
using the data on all markets simultaneously. In other words, we estimate the 
models for all markets simultaneously. Let x be the vector of age, education, 
and occupation dummies (and a constant, so x contains 10 elements). We assume 
that p, A0, A1? and 6 are log-linear functions of x, 
We distinguish between the following levels of education: (1) at most lower 
secondary education, (2) medium or higher secondary education, (3) higher 
vocational training, (4) university. The occupation levels refer to a 
categoiization based on a five-digit occupation characterization. 
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(4.4) P = e x P ( ^ x ) Ao = e x P ( ^ ) 
Ax = exp(/?3*) 6 = e x p ^ x ) 
The only restriction in comparison to separate estimation for each market is 
that in p, A0, Ar, and <5 there are no interactions bet ween age and educational 
and occupational level. In the estimation we merge the two highest levels of 
education and the two highest occupation levels in X1 and S (so /?3 and /?4 
contain 8 f ree parameters), because of computational problems encountered when 
estimating the unrestricted version . 
Variables like gender or non-wage income do not define separate labour 
markets, and hence cannot be included in x. Allowing structural parameters 
like Ax to depend on a range of personal characteristics that do not 
characterize different segments of the labour market introduces heterogeneity 
within a labour market, and the result is a different model with a different 
equilibrium wage offer distribution. So, not every parameterization of our 
model makes sense. We replicated the empirical analysis below using four type 
of industry dummies instead of the four occupation dummies, but the estimates 
of the corresponding parameters turned out to be insignificant. 
The variables in x divide the labour market into segments on the basis of 
observed characteristics. However, this segmentation may not be sufficiently 
detailed. For example, within each category defined by age and levels of 
education and occupation, there may be separate segments. They can be 
distinguished by unobserved heterogeneity variables v affecting the structural 
parameters. It is important to include this into the model. In particular, as 
noted in Section 2, allowing for sufficiënt heterogeneity in the productivity 
level p improves the fit to the wage data. We therefore replace the 
specification for p in (4.4) by 
(4.5) p = •ü.exp(/31'x) 
We assume that v has a discrete distribution with three unknown points of 
support. The family of discrete distributions is attractive for reasons of 
flexibility as well as for computational reasons. We experimented with 
additional points of support, but during the ML procedure these sometimes 
converged to existing ones while at other times they caused the p for certain 
For the highest education and occupation categoiies, which are the smallest 
categories, transitions from employment to unemployment are xarely observed. 
Moreover, as will be shown below, the information in the wage data does not 
contribute much to the estimation of the aTrival rate parameters. 
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values of x and v to converge to wL. We denote the three points of support by 
v1<v2<v3, and the corresponding probabilities by exp(gj)/(£ exp(5i)), with 
normalization g3=0. The parameter in /?x corresponding to the constant in x is 
normalized to zero. 
The distribution of v does not depend on x, so that (4.5) effectively 
increases the number of segments by a factor equal to the number of points of 
support of v. Hence, each segment as defined by x consists of three 
subsegments. As a consequence, F and G (conditional on x) are mixtures of F 
and G in the model without heterogeneity (see Eckstein and Wolpin (1992) for a 
similar approach in an equilibrium matching model). The likelihood is simply 
obtained by integrating the likelihood derived in Subsection 4.1 over the 
discrete distribution of v. In Section 5 we also examine whether the other 
structural parameters depend on v. Those extensions turn out to be empirically 
uninteresting. 
For each segment, the benefits level b is taken to be the corresponding 
predicted value of a regression of the observed log unemployment benefits on 
the dummy variables defining the segments. Alternatively, one could treat b as 
an unknown parameter with a parameterization analogous to (4.4). From the 
information in the survey, the mandatory minimum wage wL can be calculated for 
each respondent. The resulting values vary slightly within segments. In the 
empirical analysis, we take the sample average per segment. In Section 5 we 
argue that (within bounds) the way in which b and wL are calculated does not 
substantially alter the main results. 
5. Results 
5.1. Parameter estimates and their implications 
We estimated the model by ML, using the BHHH algorithm with analytical 
derivatives. The univariate and bivariate integrals in the likelihood are 
evaluated numerically using Gauss-Legendre quadrature. The parameter estimates 
for the model with only observed heter ogeneity are in Table 1. Time and money 
are measured in months and Dutch Guilders, respectively. For the education, 
age, and occupation level dummies, the reference categories are level of 
education 1, age 16-22, and occupation level 1, respectively. 
s 
This can be interpreted as suggesting that in. reality the location of the 
mass points of v valies over the segments (i.e. is dependent on x), contrary 
to what is assumed. 
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Given the parameter estimates, we can calculate estimates of p, A0, Al5 Ó, 
r, w, and the mean of F(w) for every labour market segment. The sample 
averages of these estimates are listed in Table 2. Because the effect of age 
is particularly pronounced, we also list averages per age category. Generally, 
the values of these averages seem to be in accordance with intuition. All 
three rates (A0, Xx, S) are monotonically decreasing in age. For every age 
category 8 < A0 < Xv Because 6 is much smaller than Alt w is very close to p. 
If 8IXX tends to zero, t.e. if the number of offers during a spell of 
employment is very large, workers climb the wage ladder with high speed, and 
the resulting competition between firms causes F(w) and G(w) to tend to a 
degenerate distribution at p. 
Because in most segments A0 is smaller than Ax, most unemployed 
individuals have a reservation wage r < b. In other words, most unemployed 
individuals are willing to accept a job with a wage equal to or even below the 
benefits level. As noted in Section 2, this is in line with previous empirical 
results based on partial job search models. Further, in most segments r<wL, so 
in general the lowest wage offer w equals the mandatory minimum wage. As a 
result, in most segments there holds that r<b<wL = w<w<p, although 
given the age category there are also segments with a different ordering. 
The equilibrium wage offer distribution implies that employers have 
monopsony power. The measure of monopsony power fj, in Table 2 is defined for 
each segment as 
W * = ^iW wflü EF(w) = p - (p-w).il±Sh±fl. 
In traditional monopsony models of the labour market, (p-w)/w is used as a 
measure of the monopsony power of the firm. In the present context, wages are 
dispersed, so (5.1) merely gives an indication of the average monopsony power 
of firms. It should be noted that in traditional models as well as in the 
present model, wf(p-w) equals the elasticity of the steady state workforce of 
the firm with respect to the wage offered by the firm (Machin and Manning 
(1991)). So, fj, can also be interpreted as the relative increase in w needed 
for a 1% increase in the workforce of the firm, evaluated at w = EF(w). 
Monopsony power is not very strong in any segment. This can be explained 
by the f act that in general search frictions in employment are small, so 
individuals move relatively fast to jobs with high wages. Still, firms offer 
wages that are on average 13% below the competitive wage. 
Table 2 also gives the steady-state levels of unemployment u/m. Except for 
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the age category 16-22 these are close to the national statistics for the 
mid-80s. For young individuals the assumption of a constant inflow rate into 
employment prior to the date of the first interview (which follows from the 
equilibrium CTMC assumption in Subsection 4.1) may be severely violated 
because these individuals left school not very long before that interview. In 
that case 6 is underestimated from the employment durations ongoing at the 
date of the first interview, and u/m is overestimated. 
The results can be used to calculate more statistics than those presented 
in Table 2. For example, ((6+\)/6) equals the ratio l(w)/i(w) of the 
workforces of the largest and smallest firms in a segment. 
We performed some simple sensitivity checks on the specification of the 
model. First, we deleted the information on the accepted wages after a 
job-to-job transition. In the notation of Section 4, this means that we set 
dw=l for all individuals, so information on behaviour after such transitions 
is not used. If the distribution of accepted wages from a job differs from the 
distribution of accepted wages from unemployment, we expect changes in the 
estimates. Ho wever, the estimates (not reported) do not differ much from those 
in Tables 1 and 2. The latter conclusion also holds for estimation results 
obtained for the model in which wage measurement errors are additive (so w = 
w+s) and normally distributed. We also estimated the model using observed 
unemployment durations only. This amounts to estimating a reduced-form 
duration model with the duration having an exponential distribution with 
parameter exp(/?2x). K turns out that the parameter estimates are virtually 
equal to those for A0 in Table 1. 
The estimate of a implies that in 95% (5%) of all cases the observed wage 
is within (outside of) a range of 41% of the true wage. Table 3 decomposes the 
total variation in observable wage offers into three components due to (z) the 
wage measurement error variation, (ii) the observed between-market variation, 
and (Ui) the within-market variation due to the matching process. These 
components are computed by successive conditioning of var(w) on e and x, using 
the estimated F and o and the empirical distribution of x to calculate the 
values of the components. In formula, 
var(w) = [Ex(Ef(w|x))] .var£(e) + E£(e ).varx(Ef(w|x)) + 
(5.2) 
+ E ^ - E ^ v a r ^ w l x ) ) 
Because w is a nonlinear function of e and x, the decomposition is dependent 
on the order of the successive conditioning. However, the results are not 
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sensitive to this order. 
The model itself explains only 1996 of the variation in observable wage 
offers. This is a consequence of the f act that the parameter estimates imply 
that F{w) is concentrated near p. Recall that this in turn is a consequence of 
the fact that the estimate of XJ6 is quite large. In the data, transitions 
from one job to another are much more frequently observed than transitions 
from a job to unemployment. Apparently, the information in the duration data 
dominates the information in the wage data (Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) arrive 
at the same conclusion in the estimation of a wholly different equilibrium 
search model). 
Even though we allow for differences across segments as defined by 
observables x, a large fraction of the variation in observable wage offers is 
"explained" by measurement errors. However, as noted below equation (2.12), 
allowing for sufficiënt unobserved heterogeneity in p improves the fit to the 
wage data. In Table 4 we report estimation results for the model with 
unobserved heterogeneity in p. Except for the the estimate of o , the 
estimates do not differ much from Table 1. The estimated distribution of v is 
skewed to the right. As a consequence, the fractions of workers affiliated to 
segments associated with v=vu v=v2 and v—v3 are 81%, 16% and 3%, 
respectively. The segments associated with v2 (v3) have values of p that are 
36% (95%) higher than that of the segments associated with vx. 
Table 5 shows that the characteristics of the equilibrium (averaged over 
the distribution of v) are almost identical to those in Table 2, with the main 
exception of Xx which is smaller than in Table 2. As a result, Xx is fairly 
close to A0, so search in employment is about as effective as in unemployment. 
This in turn implies that r and b generally do not differ much from each 
other. Because b and wL are the same as in the model without unobserved 
heterogeneity, this means that again w=wL for most segments. 
The monopsony power averaged over the distribution of v is the same as in 
Table 2. Segments with v=v1 have a value of /x which is generally smaller than 
the value of fi for segments with v=v2 or v=v3. 
The inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity improves the fit of the model 
substantially. When going from the model without unobserved heterogeneity to 
the model in which v has a discrete distribution with at most 2 points of 
support (which amounts to adding 2 parameters), the log likelihood increases 
with 105 points (from -26425 to -26320). When increasing the maximum number of 
points of support from 2 to 3 (which again amounts to adding 2 parameters), 
the log likelihood increases further with 14 points. In the latter model, the 
estimate of o is about half of that in the model without unobserved 
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heterogeneity. As a result, in 95% (5%) of all cases the observed wage is 
within (outside of) a range of 29% of the true wage. 
The estimates allow us to decompose the total variation in observable wage 
offers into four components due to (i) the wage measurement error variation, 
(ii) the observed between-market variation, (iii) the between-market variation 
due to unobserved heterogeneity in p, and (iv) the within-market variation due 
to the matching process (see Table 3). The approach is similar to that for the 
model without unobserved heterogeneity (see equation (5.2) above). In formula, 
*"' 2 2 
var(w) = [ExEJLF(w\x,v))] .var£(e) + E£(e ).vaxx(EjL,F(w\x,v)) 
(5.3) 
+ E£{£2).Ex(vaxv(EF{w\x,v))) + E£{e2).ExEv(va,TF(w\x,v)) 
Clearly, the variation due to e is much smaller than in the model without 
unobserved heterogeneity. The between-market variation due to unobserved 
heterogeneity in p constitutes a substantial part of the wage variation. In 
conclusion, the model with unobserved heterogeneity in p seems to be a more 
satisfactory model. 
We also estimated model versions with unobserved heterogeneity in the 
arrival rates A0, Ax and 6. Negative duration dependence of an observed exit 
rate can be explained by the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, so allowing 
for the latter may improve the fit to the duration data. Prior to the 
structural estimation we estimated simple reduced-form duration models for the 
transition rates from unemployment to employment and vice versa and from one 
job to other jobs. Only for the transition rate from unemployment to 
9 
employment did we find evidence for negative duration dependence. This 
suggests that there is unobserved heterogeneity in A0 but not in X1 and 6. 
Because of the complicated way in which most parameters affect F, the analysis 
of relations between the duration spent in a state and the accepted wage after 
leaving that state does not give insights into sources of heterogeneity. 
In the structural estimation we allowed for between-market unobserved 
heterogeneity in the arrival rates, and we took specifications analogous to 
(4.5) with discrete distributions for the unobserved heterogeneity terms. The 
results are in accordance to the reduced-form results mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. We found evidence for unobserved heterogeneity in A0 with 
two points of support (the log likelihood in the model without unobserved 
9 The fact that job durations do not display negative duration dependence is in 
line with previous studies based on Dutch data (Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991), 
Van den Berg (1992)). 
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heterogeneity in p equals -26415). The other estimates are virtually identical 
to those in Table 1. As can be expected, this extension does not improve the 
fit to the wage data. The unobserved heterogeneity in A0 can explain only 2% 
of the variation in observable wage offers. The ML estimates of the unobserved 
heterogeneity distributions for Ax and 8 turned out to be degenerate. 
The model does not allow for an unobserved component in b, let alone for 
unobserved heterogeneity in b. However, it is questionable whether such a 
generalization would improve the fit to the wage data. The value of b affects 
F and G by way of the lower bound of their support. Given that the duration 
information dominates the wage information, and that the resulting estimate of 
XJS is very large, most probability mass of F and G is concentrated close to 
p, and there is virtually no mass in the left tail of these distributions. 
Consequently, changing the value of b (within bounds) for some or all 
individuals will not affect the fit (note that therefore smaE biases in the 
values of b and wL will not affect the fit either). For similar reasons, it is 
not clear whether allowing for within-market heterogeneity can improve the fit 
to the wage data very much. On the other hand, as will be argued below, such 
generalizations may generate different policy implications. 
The model of Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) can be estimated with duration 
data only. This provides a natural specification test. For our model such an 
approach is not natural because in our model the exit rate out of the job 
depends on the wage which is observed with error. 
5.2. Effect of a change in the minimum wage 
It is interesting to examine the effect of an increase of the legal minimum 
wage on equilibrium unemployment in the present context. As mentioned in 
Burdett and Mortensen (1993), the imposition of a minimum wage wL does not 
affect equilibrium unemployment as long as wL<p. A minimum wage exceeding the 
reservation wage r merely redistributes part of the rent of the match from the 
firm to the worker, or, in other words, it decreases the monopsony power of 
the firm. In a segmented labour market consisting of segments with different 
productivity levels, the imposition of a minimum wage wL exceeding the 
productivity level p of a particular segment makes all firms in that segment 
unprofitable. All individuals associated with segments for which p<wL are 
permanently unemployed (or, perhaps more accurately, are nonparticipant on the 
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labour market) . So, in a segmented labour market the minimum wage causes a 
trade-off between monopsony power and unemployment. 
It turns out that a 25% increase of the legal minimum wage makes 7 
segments unprofitable on a total of 174 segments (the data contain 58 
different types of individuals in terms of their x value, and for each x value 
there are 3 possible v values). These segments together contain 16% of all 
individuals (see Table 6). So, a 25% increase of the minimum wage makes 16% of 
the workers permanently unemployed. Most of the individuals affected by the 
25% increase of wL are between 22 and 30 years of age. Not surprisingly, this 
is also the age group for which the corresponding labour market segments 
display the weakest monopsony power n of the firms. 
Note that because the number of segments is finite, the size of the effect 
does not vary smoothly with the size of the change of wL. The size of the 
effect depends on the distribution of the levels of p, and a more smooth 
specification of this distribution should give a more accurate estimate of the 
effect of small changes of wL. Now suppose that the over-all shape of the 
distribution of p above wL can be extrapolated to values of p just below wL. 
Then our results suggest that unemployment of individuals aged in their 
twenties can be reduced in the long run if their minimum wage is reduced. 
(Such reasoning is similar to that applied in structural empirical analyses of 
partial job search models when addressing the effects of downward shifts in 
b.) 
In a labour market with considerable observed and unobserved heterogeneity 
in p, a uniform minimum wage can easily cause unemployment, and this can only 
be avoided by making the minimum wage dependent on p. Imposing a minimum wage 
can make firms unprofitable in the Albrecht-Axell model as well. However, in 
the single labour market of that model, workers can shift from 
low-productivity to high-productivity firms. In the heterogeneous 
Burdett-Mortensen model such shifts cannot occur, so that the two models 
represent polar cases. A synthesis of these models would improve our insight 
into the effect of the minimum wage on unemployment. 
A change of the benefits level b has the same qualitative implications for 
unemployment as a change of wL. If the new value of b exceeds the productivity 
level p of a particular segment, then all individuals in that segment become 
permanently unemployed. It turns out that even a 25% increase of the benefits 
levels in all segments keeps b well below the corresponding values of p. So, 
10 
It should be noted that in tables 2 and 4 for every segment the estimated 
value of p exceeds w^. 
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moderate changes of b do not affect unemployment. This is in line with the 
results cited in Section 2. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have estimated the Burdett-Mortensen equilibrium search model 
of the labour market. In this model, the distributions of wage offers and 
earnings are endogenous and non-degenerate. We allowed for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity across different segments of the labour market. It 
turned out that the possibility of on-the-job search has a distinctive effect 
on the equilibrium wage offer and earnings distributions. Because the job 
offer arrival rate while employed is much larger than the layoff rate, workers 
can climb the wage ladder with high speed, and as a result most wages within a 
particular segment are concentrated close to the marginal revenue product. As 
a consequence, the homogeneous model explains about 2096 of the variation in 
observable wage offers. Observed and unobserved heterogeneity in productivity 
levels across segments turned out to be the other main determinant of wages. 
The results were used to examine the effects of changes in the mandatory 
minimum wage on unemployment. Because for most individuals aged in their 
twenties the productivity level is close to the present mandatory minimum 
wage, changing the latter has a large impact on the level of unemployment for 
those individuals. 
The model can explain most of the observed wage variation as due to either 
the process of labour market search or to heterogeneity in the parameters, in 
particular in p. Hence, we are more optimistic than Eckstein and Wolpin who 
conclude that in their model the wage variation is mainly "explained" by 
measurement error. Of course, a synthesis of the two models is desirable. 
Mortensen (1990) discusses such a synthesis. A potential problem is that 
uniqueness of equilibrium in the synthesis has not been proven. As argued in 
Section 5, empirical analysis of such a synthesis may increase our 
understanding of the effect of policy interventions as a change in the 
mandatory minimum wage. 
Finally, it is clear the demand side of the model is not very realistic. 
In particular, the model assumes a stationary environment, and thus it does 
not allow for external shocks that lead to the creation or destruction of jobs 
at firms. Although incorporation of this would make the model very 
complicated, it seems important to direct future research to this as well. 
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Table 1. Estimates for the equilibrium search model: observed heterogeneity 
(standard errors). 
parameter p X0 Ax 6 
constant 7.17 (0.03) -2.94 (0.14) -2.23 (0.47) -4.24 (0.14) 
education level 2 0.06 (0.02) 0.31 (0.11) 0.34 (0.27) -0.02 (0.11) 
education level 3 0.16 (0.02) 0.46 (0.16) 
education level 4 0.27 (0.03) 0.37 (0.22) 
0.46 (0.32) 0.22 (0.15) 
age category 23-29 0.24 (0.03) -0.41 (0.16) -0.26 (0.46) -0.80 (0.14) 
age category 30-38 0.39 (0.03) -0.95 (0.17) -0.96 (0.46) -1.56 (0.15) 
age category 39-70 0.47 (0.03) -1.53 (0.16) -1.67 (0.45) -2.13 (0.14) 
occupation level 2 0.06 (0.02) 0.05 (0.13) -0.44 (0.34) -0.02 (0.11) 
occupation level 3 0.14 (0.02) -0.16 (0.18) 
occupation level 4 0.30 (0.02) 0.25 (0.20) 
-0.61 (0.35) 0.04 (0.15) 
a
2
 0.0447 (0.0013) 
log likelihood = -26425 
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Table 2. Characteristics of the equilibrium: observed heterogeneity. 
age category: 16-22 23-29 30-38 39-70 average 
p (productivity) 1435 1941 2353 2532 2208 
A0 (arrival rate in 0.065 0.047 0.029 0.016 0.033 
unemployment) 
Ax (arrival in 0.095 0.075 0.037 0.018 0.047 
employment) 
6 (separation rate) 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.005 
r (reservation wage) 607 756 1038 1226 982 
w (highest wage) 1426 1937 2345 2521 2200 
Ef(w) (mean wage 1267 1761 2023 2153 1917 
offer) 
w (lowest wage) 999 1449 1450 1506 1420 
b (benefits level) 807 1120 1248 1320 1192 
fj, (monopsony power) 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.14 
u/m (unemployment) 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.12 
# observations 212 494 595 648 1949 
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Table 3. Decomposition of total variation in observable wage offers. 
, , observed heterogeneity observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity 
due to e 44% 23% 
due to x 37% 33% 
due to v in p - 21% 
due to w 19% 22% 
Tables 4 and 5: see next pages. 
Table 6. The percentage of individuals becoming unemployed when the minimum 
wage is increased. 
, , observed heterogeneity observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity 
10% increase of wL: 
average 0% 3% 
age category 16-22 0% 0% 
age category 23-29 0% 10% 
age category 30-38 0% 0% 
age category 39-70 0% 0% 
25% increase of wL: 
average 11% 16% 
age category 16-22 0% 15% 
age category 23-29 42% 56% 
age category 30-38 0% 0% 
age category 39-70 0% 0% 
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Table 4. Estimates equilibrium search model: observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity (Standard errors), 
parameter V 
constant 0 (-) -2.92 (0.13) -2.46 (0.37) -4.21 (0.14) 
education level 2 0.06 (0.02) 0.31 (0.10) 0.28 (0.22) 
education level 3 0.14 (0.02) 0.51 (0.15) 
education level 4 0.24 (0.03) 0.53 (0.20) 
-0.02 (0.11) 
0.49 (0.28) 0.21 (0.15) 
age category 23-29 0.25 (0.03) -0.40 (0.16) -0.40 (0.37) -0.78 (0.14) 
age category 30-38 0.42 (0.03) -0.95 (0.16) -1.20 (0.36) -1.52 (0.15) 
age category 39-70 0.47 (0.03) -1.53 (0.15) -1.75 (0.36) -2.11 (0.14) 
occupation level 2 0.06 (0.02) 0.05 (0.13) -0.46 (0.26) -0.00 (0.11) 
occupation level 3 0.11 (0.02) -0.19 (0.18) 
occupation level 4 0.26 (0.02) 0.13 (0.18) 
-0.27 (0.29) -0.01 (0.15) 
log Vi 7.10 (0.03) 3i 3.35 (0.30) 
log v2 7.41 (0.04) ?2 1.72 (0.31) 
log vz 7.77 (0.05) ?3 0 (-) 
2 
a 
0.0220 (0.0013) 
log likelihood = -26306 
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Table 5. Characteristics of the equilibrium: observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
age category: 16-22 23-29 30-38 39-70 average 
p (productivity) 1446 1951 2392 2509 2216 
A0 (arrival rate in 0.066 0.048 0.029 0.016 0.033 
unemployment) 
Aj (arrival in 0.075 0.055 0.025 0.015 0.035 
employment) 
6 (separation rate) 0.015 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.005 
r (reservation wage) 743 1022 1352 1400 1218 
w (highest wage) 1433 1944 2379 2495 2204 
Ej.(w) (mean wage 1268 1762 2046 2130 1917 
offer) 
w (lowest wage) 999 1450 1475 1502 1426 
b (benefits level) 807 1120 1248 1320 1192 
(j, (monopsony power) 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.17 0.14 
u/m (unemployment) 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.12 
# observations 212 494 595 648 1949 
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